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WHEN THE CULTURAL EXPLANATION IS 
INADEQUATE: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS OF CHINESE JUDGES IN DIVORCE 
CASES 
Xin He12 
The existing literature has long attributed the gendered outcomes in 
China’s divorce litigation to the influential patriarchal culture outside 
and inside the courtroom. This Article argues that such an explanation 
remains inadequate. Instead, it contends that institutional constraints that 
judges are subject to, a factor largely ignored by the existing literature, 
play a crucial role in generating gendered outcomes. The judges are 
responding to two sets of interrelated institutional constraints: efficiency 
concerns and stability concerns. The efficiency concerns mean that 
judges are supposed to handle cases efficiently. The stability concerns 
mean that the court decision is accepted by the litigation parties and by 
society at large, and it does not foment social instability. Due to these 
concerns, judges often choose the most efficient, yet safest way to handle 
issues in divorce litigation. They do not alleviate cultural biases against 
women—rather, they perpetuate them.  
Focusing on women’s hesitancy to raise gender-related issues, an 
aspect illuminating on the cultural bias, this Article demonstrates how 
judges, under institutional concerns, turn a blind eye to their suffering. 
Judges rarely inform women of their rights; furthermore, they avoid the 
issues even when they learn the facts. Occasionally, they use the issue as 
a bargaining chip to facilitate closing a case. Suffering from this gender 
bias in court, women fail to voice their claims and are awarded less 
property or compensation than they deserve. This Article argues that due 
to judges’ inaction toward the traditional and cultural taboo for women to 
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articulate their unfair treatment on gender issues, women are denied fair 
decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, Chinese courts handle 1.5 million divorce cases every 
year.3 In many senses, the outcomes of the litigation are gendered. Take 
domestic violence as one example. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
reports that 14.86% of the divorce litigation was triggered by domestic 
violence in 2016 and 2017, constituting the second most cited reason for 
filing for divorce. 4 But rarely is domestic violence recognized by the 
courts, let alone are families often awarded compensation.5 Empirical 
research based on all family cases filed in one district court in 
Chongqing, Western China, suggests that of all 458 cases involving 
claims of domestic violence, only in three, or 0.66%, were the victims 
compensated.6 For all domestic violence evidence presented in the cases 
handled by the intermediate courts in Beijing, only 17.3% were 
admitted.7 The issue of domestic violence was vaporized into the 
  
 3. A major category of civil trials in China, divorce cases, makes up 27% of all 
civil cases in 2017. In many areas, designated family courts have been set up to handle 
the growing caseloads in this area of the law, most of which are petitions for divorce. See 
ZHOU QIANG (周强), ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGZUO BAOGAO (最高人民法院工作
报告) [THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ANNUAL WORK REPORT] (2018), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-87832.html. 
 4. SIFA DASHUJU YANJIU YUAN (司法大数据研究院) [SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
COURT BIG DATA STUDY CENTER], SIFA DASHUJU ZHUANTI BAOGAO: LIHUN JIUFEN 
(司法大数据专题报告离婚纠纷) [JUDICIAL REPORT BASED ON BIG DATA: DIVORCE 
DISPUTES] (2018), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/upload/file/2018/03/23/09/33/20180323093343_53196.pdf. 
 5. Michael Palmer, Domestic Violence and Mediation in Contemporary China, 
in MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 286, 313–14 (Fu 
Hualing & Michael Palmer eds., 2017). 
 6. Chen Wei (陈苇) & Duan Weiwei (段伟伟), Fayuan Zai Fangzhi Jiating 
Baoli Zhongde Zuoyong Shizheng Yanjiu—Yi Chongqing Mouqu Renmin Fayuan Shenli 
Sheji Jiating Baoli Anjian Qingkuang Wei Duixiang 
(法院在防治家庭暴力中的作用实证研究—
以重庆某区人民法院审理涉及家庭暴力案件情况为对象) [Empirical Research of the 
Court’s Role in Combating Domestic Violence—Take Grassroot People’s Court of 
Chongqing City One District Hearing Domestic Violence Cases as Example], HEBEI 
FAXUE (河北法学) [HEBEI L. SCI.], Aug. 5, 2012, at 28, 29, 32. 
 7. Gao Xin (高鑫), Jiabao Rending Jin Yicheng, Juzheng Buli Shi Guanjian 
(家暴认定仅一成，举证不力是关键) [Only Ten Percent of Domestic Violence Cases 
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seemingly reconciliatory and friendly air of the mediation process.8 The 
gendered outcomes are also conspicuous on property division. According 
to Ke Li and Sara Friedman’s examination of 171 divorce lawsuits 
collected from Sichuan province, more often than not, “rural women 
walked away from divorce litigation with no farmland, no housing, and 
no financial compensation, let alone alimony. By contrast, their husbands 
were far more likely to retain de facto or de jure control over family and 
conjugal property.”9 
Undoubted are the outcomes which disadvantage women; less 
appreciated are the reasons behind the gendered effects. The existing 
literature has, explicitly or implicitly, attributed this to the influential 
patriarchal culture outside and inside the courtroom. Outside the 
courtroom, China’s society, to a large extent, remains a patriarchal 
society. Many Chinese still share a patrilineal belief, which regards 
women as an instrument to bypass their bloodline; naturally, children 
belong to the man’s side. The patrilocal tradition commands women to 
stay in men’s communities after marriage.10 Professor Michael Palmer 
believes that patriarchal socialism still characterizes many parts of China 
today.11 According to him, patriarchal socialism “was created in large 
part by the Chinese Communist Party’s willingness to sacrifice socialist 
goals of gender equality and women’s release from family patriarchal 
authority structures in exchange for the political support that would be 
generated by tolerating rather than attacking traditional family values.” 12 
He also believes that the lack of an independent women’s movement, a 
point related to social awareness of the gender issue, constitutes a major 
  
Was Recognized, Mainly Due to Lack of Evidence], JIANCHA RIBAO (检察日报) 
[PROCURATORATE DAILY], Nov. 2, 2016, §8. 
 8. Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, In the Name of Harmony: The Erasure of 
Domestic Violence in China’s Judicial Mediation, 27 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 97, 109 
(2013). 
 9. Ke Li & Sara L. Friedman, Wedding Marriage to the Nation-State in Modern 
China: Legal Consequences for Divorce, Property, and Women’s Rights, in DOMESTIC 
TENSIONS, NATIONAL ANXIETIES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE, CRISIS, AND 
NATION 147, 161 (Kristin Celello & Hanan Kholoussy eds., 2016). 
 10. See generally JUDITH STACEY, PATRIARCHY AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN 
CHINA (1983). 
 11. Palmer, supra note 5, at 314. 
 12. Id. at 287. 
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barrier toward fighting against domestic violence.13 When it comes to the 
partition of matrimonial property in a divorce, patriarchal culture takes a 
toll on women. Professors Li and Friedman state: 
In the countryside, longstanding patrilineal values and property 
regimes, coupled with norms of patrilocal residence after marriage, 
diminish the quality of legal advice women receive from legal workers 
and the value of settlements offered by judges and court-based 
mediators. In most cases, these outcomes reaffirm married women’s 
outsider status in their conjugal communities and their weak claims to 
conjugal property still defined in patrilineal terms, irrespective of the 
letter of the law. 
14
 
Pertaining to the courtroom, scholars argue that judges lack sufficient 
gender consciousness in protecting women’s interests and fail to realize 
this is a serious problem. Imbued with patriarchal culture, the biased 
norms have been internalized. The male’s view is so dominant that the 
judges do not realize that they are biased. Subscribing to this view, 
Professors Charles Ogletree and Rangita de Silva-de Alwis attribute the 
weak judicial protection because Chinese judges are “insensitive[e],” and 
poorly educated on the gender issue.15 This view is echoed by Palmer, 
who states that “[r]esistance to more enlightened understanding of the 
issue of domestic violence even in the post-Mao reform period was also 
fortified by unsympathetic and conservative attitudes within the 
judiciary.”16 Li and Friedman state: 
[Rural women’s] marital grievances often fall on deaf ears; their efforts 
to correct conjugal wrongs are regularly dismissed; and, at the time of 
divorce, their endeavors to actualize property rights are frequently 
blocked or even derailed by a fragmented state whose divorce actors 




 13. Id. at 313–14. 
 14. Li & Friedman, supra note 9, at 163. 
 15. Charles J. Ogletree Jr. & Rangita de Silva-de Alwis, The Recently Revised 
Marriage Law of China: The Promise and the Reality, 13 Tex. J. Women & L. 251, 285 
(2004). 
 16. Palmer, supra note 5, at 287. 
 17. Li & Friedman, supra note 9, at 158 (emphasis added). 
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Patriarchal culture is surely one reason contributing to the gendered 
outcomes in divorce litigation, especially in the rural and hinterland 
China where the culture’s impact is more pronounced. But such an 
explanation remains inadequate. If patriarchal culture was a major reason 
for the gendered outcomes in divorce litigation in the early stage of the 
reform, its role should have declined significantly today. The Chinese 
state has continued to promote the idea of gender equality in its rhetoric 
and laws.18 The norm of gender equality, along with globalization, has 
gained wide acceptance. The remarkable impact of the #MeToo 
Movement is just an example. Professor Margaret Woo argues that 
increasing the “use of the formal legal process has altered women’s sense 
of entitlement and equality.”19 The judges, even in the hinterland areas, 
are crystal clear that domestic violence is wrong and must be penalized. 
After all, a law solely devoted to fight against domestic violence has 
been promulgated in 2015.20 Some judges have managed to prove the 
presence of domestic violence, the most difficult step for evidence 
collection in the hearing.21 Should they subscribe to the patriarchal 
culture that women just deserve to be beaten, they do not even need to 
collect the evidence at all, let alone grant a divorce for them. If Ogletree 
and Alwis are right in that one of many barriers to enforce women’s legal 
rights is the problems of the judiciary, they would have not limited their 
focus on internalized judicial biases.22 There must be other reasons, 
joining forces with patriarchal culture, for the judges to render a 
gendered decision. 
  
 18. Robin Runge, Operating in a Narrow Space to Effect Change: Development 
of a Legal System Response to Domestic Violence in China, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER VIOLENCE 31–42 (Rashmi Goel & Leigh Goodmark eds., 
2015). 
 19. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Shaping Citizenship: Chinese Family law and 
Women, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 100–01 (2003); see generally Mindie Lazarus-
Black, Law and the Pragmatics of Inclusion: Governing Domestic Violence in Trinidad 
and Tobago, 28 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 388 (2001). 
 20. Fan Jiating Baoli Fa (反家庭暴力法) [Anti-Domestic Violence Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015, effective 
Mar. 1, 2016) 2016 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 27, translated in 
PKULAW.COM, https://pkulaw.com/en_law/ac57ba1df4413457bdfb.html (last visited Feb. 
6, 2019). 
 21. He & Ng, supra note 8, at 104. 
 22. See Ogletree & Alwis, supra note 15, at 284–85. 
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This Article argues that institutional constraints to which judges are 
subject, a factor largely ignored by the existing literature, play a crucial 
role in generating gendered outcomes. The importance of institutional 
safeguards in the judiciary is long noted.23 As Professors Kwai Hang Ng 
and Xin He point out, the Chinese courts are embedded.24 Extra-legal 
factors permeate into the decision-making process.25 The court is also a 
bureaucratic institution controlling the behavior of the judges.26 As a 
result, twisting the divorce law practices are the bureaucratic incentives 
of the court and its political concerns for social stability.27 The judges are 
responding to two sets of interrelated institutional constraints: efficiency 
concerns and stability concerns. 28  
The efficiency concerns mean that judges are supposed to handle 
cases efficiently. Civil Procedural Law29 stipulates that cases tried by 
ordinary procedure are to be completed within six months, and those 
using the simplified procedure have only three months to finish.30 Some 
senior officials managing their courts even shorten the limits to ninety or 
twenty days, respectively, to allow themselves more room to maneuver.31 
The case closure rate, an indication of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
  
 23. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s 
“Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 184 
(1991); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 827, 827; Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges 
and Justices Maximize?(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
1, 3 (1993); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the 
Influences on the judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1337, 1391–92 (1998). 
 24. See generally KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA (2017). 
 25. Id. at 17. 
 26. Id. at 84. 
 27. Id. at 130. 
 28. See Jonathan J. Kinkel & William J. Hurst, The Judicial Cadre Evaluation 
System in China: From Quantification to Intra-State Legibility, 2015 CHINA Q. 933, 942. 
 29. Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, amended 
June 27, 2017, effective June 27, 2017), 2017 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 508, translated in CHINA INT’L COM. CT., 
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/200/644.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
 30. Id. arts. 149, 161. 
 31. NG & HE, supra note 24, at 57. 
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court operations, appears in every court’s annual work report.32 By 
December of each year, many courts stop taking new cases so that they 
can increase the case closure rate for the year.  
The stability concerns mean that the court decision is accepted by the 
litigation parties and by society at large—it does not foment social 
instability.33 This is controlled by the appeal rate, the remand rate, the 
petition rate, and the number of malicious incidents, including social 
protests and deaths.34 The judiciary trumpets a slogan “to achieve the 
combination of both legal and social effects.”35 While the legal effects 
suggest the observations of legal principles and rules, social effects 
imply that society accepts the decision peacefully. It would be nice if the 
two were consistent and mutually reinforcing. But when they conflict, 
legal principles and rules have to make way for social effects. That is, the 
law is compromised. 
The best example to illustrate these two concerns is the revival of 
mediation. Since the early 2000s, the mediation rate has, once again, 
become an indicator for the court performance, though such a 
requirement has been abandoned by some courts during some periods, 
depending on the political environment, caseload pressures, and the 
preferences of court leaders.36 Mediation, by definition, means both 
parties have voluntarily settled on the issues. They thus have accepted 
  
 32. Kinkel & Hurst, supra note 28, at 942, 944. 
 33. See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided 
Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M.L. REV. 63, 72 (2009); 
Benjamin L. Liebman, A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?, in CONTEMPORARY 
CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 269, 269 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & 
Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011); see generally THE POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN 
CHINA (Susan Trevaskes et al. eds, 2014). 
 34. Xin He, ‘No Malicious Incidents’: The Concern for Stability in China’s 
Divorce Law Practice, 26 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 467, 469 (2017). 
 35. See Xin He, Routinization of Divorce Law Practice in China: Institutional 
Constraints’ Influence on Judicial Behaviour, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 83, 103 
(2009). 
 36. Fu Hualing& Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The 
Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 33, at 25; NG & HE, supra note 24, at 56; Yedan 
Li, Joris Kocken & Benjamin van Rooij, Understanding China’s Court Mediation Surge: 
Insights from a Local Court, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 58, 58, 60 (2018); see Fu Hualing & 
Michael Palmer, Mediation in Contemporary China: Continuity and Change, 10 J. COMP. 
L. 1, 2–4 (2015). 
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the court decision. The litigants should not appeal or petition against the 
decision. In this way, it addresses the stability concern. For some 
categories of cases, mediation could also be efficient. It saves the time of 
the judge to divide property, for example. Arguably, it also addresses the 
caseload concern. 
Due to these concerns, judges often choose the most efficient, yet 
safest way to handle issues in divorce litigation.37 Judges have to make 
sure that cases are finished before their deadline and done without 
malicious incidents.38 They want a balanced decision, acceptable for both 
parties, and without provoking extreme reactions.39 This behavior 
pattern, the Article argues, results in gendered outcomes.40 
Under such institutional constraints, the judges do not alleviate 
cultural biases against women—rather, they perpetuate them.41 With such 
an approach, they accept the patriarchal culture, and reinforce gender 
inequality, turning a blind eye to cultural bias.42 This is not because the 
judges are unaware that women’s rights are infringed upon, but because 
they just do not want to infuriate or even confront the men.43 For their 
purposes of disposing of the cases efficiently without lingering effects, to 
do otherwise would be unnecessary.44 
It is inadequate to say that the brunt to women in divorce litigation 
stems only from the judges’ lack of gender consciousness, or inequalities 
and biases outside the court.45 One fundamental reason is that the judges, 
catering to institutional concerns, consciously and inadvertently, make 
decisions detrimental to women.46 Driven by these concerns, they allow 
the forces of inequality in social, economic, cultural, and political areas 
to infiltrate their decisions.47 It is the institutional reasons that prevent the 
judges from offering a level playing field for women. Equality can only 
  
 37. He, supra note 35, at 103–04. 
 38. See supra text accompanying notes 29–35. 
 39. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra Part V. 
 41. See infra Parts II–III. 
 42. See infra Part 0. 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See infra Part IV. 
 45. See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
 46. See infra Part V. 
 47. See infra Part VI. 
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be invoked and fulfilled when the courts have acted. 48 Thus, the 
institutional failure to enforce the laws has become a major obstacle to 
gender justice. 
Focusing on women’s hesitancy to raise gender-related issues, an 
aspect illuminating the cultural bias, this Article demonstrates how 
judges, under institutional concerns, turn a blind eye to their suffering.49 
Judges rarely inform women of their rights; furthermore, they avoid the 
issues even when they learn the facts.50 Occasionally, they use the issue 
as a bargaining chip to facilitate closing a case.51 Suffering from this 
gender bias in court, women fail to voice their claims and are awarded 
less property or compensation than they deserve.52 This Article argues 
that due to judges’ inaction toward the traditional and cultural taboo for 
women to articulate their unfair treatment on gender issues, women are 
denied fair decisions.53 The data presented was collected from the 
author’s decade-long fieldwork investigations and participant 
observations from a rural court in Shaanxi Province, Western China.54 
II. SEX AS A TABOO 
Around 1927, Wen Hsiu famously filed to divorce her husband Pu Yi, 
China’s last emperor, in part because of his sadism and in part because of 
his inability to father children.55 Journalist Behr praised her as 
courageous with great willpower.56Almost a century later, are Chinese 
women freer to raise gender-and-sex-related issues in their divorce 
litigation? How do the courts and judges respond to the issues?  
Recent decades have witnessed sexual liberation in China. “Sex—in 
some form or other—has emerged from obscurity to occupy a position of 
  
 48. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 239 
(1989). 
 49. See infra Part 0. 
 50. See infra Part 0. 
 51. See infra Part 0. 
 52. See infra Part VI–0. 
 53. See infra Part 0II. 
 54. [Editorial Note: Parts 0-0 are based on the author’s fieldwork and solely on 
file with the author himself.] 
 55. See EDWARD BEHR, THE LAST EMPEROR 177 (1987). 
 56. See id. 
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unprecedented prominence in public life in the People’s Republic.”57 
Issues of sexual autonomy and independence have become more 
frequently examined and debated. At the time of this writing, many 
social elites have fallen from grace as the #MeToo movement sweeps 
through China. 
Sexual problems have been a factor contributing to divorce in China.58 
Extra-marital affairs are often cited by litigants to gain the upper hand in 
legal battles, especially in the more developed areas and when they have 
a legal representative.59 Common in the catalog of evidence are intimate 
text messages, contrition letters, and promises to rectify.60 After all, 
extra-marital affairs have become a social reality that can now be 
discussed in public settings. 
On the other hand, despite decades of influence from the outside 
world, “[t]he two sexes are characterized by different forms of sexual 
behavior. Normal male behavior is open and outwardly expressive, 
whereas, in the female, it is more hidden and shy. This signifies a 
difference between male activity and initiative and female passivity, 
which is determined by sexual physiology and psychology.”61 Moreover, 
the Chinese state has maintained control over sex and sexuality, as part 
of the agenda toward social harmony,62 and it has to keep sex issues in 
the family.63 
  
 57. Harriet Evans, Defining Difference: The “Scientific” Construction of 
Sexuality and Gender in the People’s Republic of China, 20 SIGNS 357, 357 (1995). 
 58. Louisa Lim, ‘Lightning Divorces’ Strike China’s ‘Me Generation’, NPR, 
(Nov. 17, 2010, 3:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2010/11/09/131200166/china-s-me-
generation-sends-divorce-rate-soaring. 
 59. Zhuang Pinghui, Why Millions of Chinese People are Filing for Divorce 
Every Year, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 30, 2017, 8:01 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2117424/why-millions-chinese-people-
are-filing-divorce-every-year. 
 60. See Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, Inquisitorial Adjudication and Institutional 
Constraints in Chinese Civil Justice, 35 L. & POL’Y 298, 301–02 (2013). 
 61. XING ZHISHI BAIKE (性知识百科), [ENCYLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 
SEX] 97 (Wang Peng (王鹏) et al. eds., 1983). 
 62. Gary Sigley, Sex, Politics and the Policing of Virtue in the People’s Republic 
of China, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN CHINA 43, 43–45, 48–49 (Elaine Jeffreys ed., 2006). 
 63. Id. at 44, 50. 
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Evidence suggests that male impotency is a common problem in 
reform China.64 Discussions of impotence in the media and on the 
Internet are common.65 Flyers on lamp posts along city alleys advertise 
clinics for sexually transmitted diseases and male sexual dysfunction.66 
Commercials appear on TV and in other media touting “herbal tonics to 
cure impotence.”67 In Dr. Everett Yuehong Zhang’s words, impotency is 
an epidemic.68 Nonetheless, a search for publicly available adjudication 
documents reveals only a handful of such issues that have surfaced in the 
decisions. Of 1.9 million divorce cases from 2008-2018, only 654 
petitions filed by women were on the basis of male impotence.69 Zhang 
finds no research supporting the “rise in the incidence of divorce due to 
male impotence.”70 At least in these public sources, the instances in 
which women file petitions based on male sexual impotence are 
disproportionally low.71  
Consistent with the search outcome, my fieldwork investigation and 
interviews with judges confirm that topics related to sex, such as male 
impotence, marital or domestic rape, and homosexuality, are rarely 
touched upon in the litigation process.72 This is especially true in rural 
and hinterland areas where these topics remain, by and large, taboo.73 
Mentioning husbands’ impotence seems to suggest women’s indecent 
desires, falling into the stereotype of licentiousness. Any open talk of 
male impotence seems embarrassing, and contrary to the image of a 
decent wife or woman.74 The traditional picture of the female body 
  
 64. See EVERETT YUEHONG ZHANG, THE IMPOTENCE EPIDEMIC: MEN’S MEDICINE 
AND SEXUAL DESIRE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (2015). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2, 5. 
 69. PUHUI FAZHI ZHINENG PINGTAI (普惠法治智能平台) [LEGAL INTELLIGENT 
PLATFORM], http://phfz.lawbbd.com/ (search in search bar for “sextual impotence” and 
“divorce”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 70. ZHANG, supra note 64, at 123. 
 71. See id. at 124. 
 72. See infra Part III. 
 73. See infra Part III. 
 74. Petula Sik Ying Ho et al., Sex with Chinese Characteristics: Sexuality 
Research in/on 21st-Century China, 55 J. SEX RES. 486, 491, 510 (2018); cf. Valeriya 
Safronova, What’s So ‘Indecent’ About Female Pleasure?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18. 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/style/sex-toy-ces.html. 
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remains passive: she never initiates sex, nor does she demand 
satisfaction.75 The matter, though central to most marriages, is almost 
invisible in the legal battle.76 For cases in which this is the real issue, 
most female litigants are reticent about it.77 Both parties ostensibly focus 
on other issues.78 At most, they hint at it, before brushing it off.79  
III. INHIBITED WOMEN 
The following four wives were the exceptions among the victims of 
the inhibited sex problem.80 Indeed, according to the judges that I 
interviewed, they had learned about the situation inadvertently during the 
mediation process. None of them had left any trace in the case filing 
statements; nor had they raised it in the court trial process. The courts 
had never recorded anything either, of course. In a way, how these cases 
were told already revealed the cultural obstacles to women articulating 
this problem. The female litigants, often the victims of the cultural bias, 
had to overcome psychological barriers just to speak out.  
A twenty-five-year-old woman from a village in Shandong was 
married to an optimistic and outspoken lorry driver from a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) in Shaanxi (henceforth the Shandong Waitress’s Case). 
She had met him through her uncle, an executive at the SOE, which 
employed his parents as well. Her uncle had been well-intended. He had 
hoped the marriage would enable his niece, along with her father (his 
elder brother) and her mother, to come live with him in Shaanxi. With 
his help, his niece had been assigned to work as a waitress in the SOE’s 
canteen, and both of her parents got temporary jobs in the SOE. 
Two years later, after the unexpected death of the uncle, the marriage 
went sour. According to the filing statement of the divorce petition, the 
trigger of the divorce petition had been intensifying conflict between the 
couple’s parents. They had even gotten into a physical altercation, just 
two weeks before she had filed the petition, and he had threatened to kick 
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her parents out of his home. Her main requests, in addition to divorce, 
had been to receive compensation for her contribution to their 
matrimonial apartments, which had been subsidized by the SOE because 
of his employment. 
The judge, a middle-aged woman, tried to settle the case with the 
standard inquiry into the cause of the divorce. It was in the pre-trial 
mediation session that she accidentally uncovered the genuine reason for 
divorce—she had suggested that family disputes would subside once 
they had a child. When pressed, the plaintiff said that it would be 
impossible for them to have children. 
Surprised, the judge pushed further, “Is it related to your health?”  
The plaintiff looked around, making sure that nobody was in sight and 
the door was closed. She then lowered her voice, as if it were a secret 
buried for ages:  
No. He has problems in that regard. Having been married for two years, 
we are like never married. Impotent, he cannot have a child. I have 
known the marriage was not sustainable since its very beginning. Half a 
year after being married I told my mother, who stopped me from telling 
anybody else. She was afraid that my uncle’s family would become 
aware of it. One year later, our conflict intensified, and I told my aunt 
(her uncle’s wife) about it. Initially skeptical, she was eventually 
convinced by my mother-in-law. Indeed, without informing me, my 
husband went to a big hospital in the capital city for treatment. But it 
was not cured. My aunt persuaded my mother to accept this: it was not 
easy to find a trustworthy family; perhaps adopting a child would do. 
Since back then my whole family had relied on my uncle, my mother 
was afraid to say no. For that period, I basically lived with my parents, 
as he was pulling gambling all-nighters, without coming home.  
None of this was mentioned during the formal trial. In fact, she was 
inhibited in front of the defendant, a collegial panel of three, a clerk who 
took notes of the trial process, two lawyers representing her and one 
lawyer for the defendant, and ten witnesses. The trial focused on her 
claims of the man’s gambling practices, a so-called pernicious habit, and 
family discord. When the man agreed to divorce, the focus soon switched 
to who was the real owner of the apartment, and whether the woman, 
along with her natal family, had deliberately encroached upon the man’s 
property by marrying him. 
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Male impotence is thus a taboo subject. The man has been reluctant to 
let anyone know of his condition because it concerned his manly dignity. 
He had not let his wife know about his efforts for treatment. For a young 
wife, it was also hard to speak out. Indeed, the woman was pressed by 
the judge, who pushed for the reason for divorce. The woman had been 
afraid that without telling the judge the truth, her efforts to get financial 
compensation would have been jeopardized, though the woman had 
overcome significant psychological barriers. She had not told her mother 
until half a year into the marriage. Only after a year had passed did she 
tell her aunt, the most important relative of her family. Furthermore, this 
had occurred only after the young couple’s conflict had become 
unbearable. Also buoying her courage was her experience in the 
suburban areas where she had worked for two years. Still, she remained 
cautious. She looked over her shoulders when she told the judge about 
this. Nowhere in the filing statement was it mentioned. It is possible she 
may have not even informed her two young lawyers. Her inhibition was 
consistent with that of her mother. When informed, her mother had 
advised her “not to tell anybody else.” She had been afraid that the 
uncle’s wife, the mastermind of the marriage, and their most important 
relative in Shaanxi, would have been embarrassed. Similarly, her aunt’s 
reaction, after learning this, had been to cover it up and look for 
alternatives, despite the woman being only twenty-three-years-old. Her 
advice was to adopt a child. These individuals had shared the conception 
that male impotency was an embarrassing topic, not suitable for open 
discussion. 
Such an inhibited tendency was also found in the Bride-Price Case, in 
which a migrant worker in his mid-twenties had filed for divorce because 
the woman, also a migrant worker, had “refused to live with him.” In the 
filing statement, the man stated that they had met through a matchmaker 
and got married the fifth time they saw each other. One caveat was in 
order. This was not a love-at-first-sight story. The first three times they 
met the couple talked. They were engaged on the fourth meeting, in 
which the man paid a 130,000 yuan (RMB) bride-price.81 Then, on the 
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fifth meeting, they applied for their marriage certificate. The woman then 
kicked him out of their bedroom the week they were married, and they 
never lived together. In the official response, the woman stated, “I agreed 
to a divorce. For the year we were married, I rarely lived with the man, 
and we did not have much to talk about. He was not capable of making 
money.” 
However, they could not reconcile the issue of the bride-price, and the 
woman also refused to return the living expenses that she had received 
from the man while they had been married. The responsible judge, a man 
in his forties, trying to mediate the case, felt puzzled: Why did she not 
want to live with the man? He then asked a female judge from the district 
court, also in her forties, who happened to visit the dispatched tribunal 
where the case was filed, to talk to the woman. Taking the woman to 
another room, she proposed that the wife continued to live with the man 
so that he would withdraw the petition. The wife responded:  
It was not me who did not want to live with him. It was him who was 
afraid of living with me. When I took off my clothes, he would tremble, 
rolling himself into a ball. Every time it was like that; he was unable to 
do it. For the whole year, we never sleep together. In front of so many 
people, I cannot speak this out.  
Similar to the Shandong woman, she had revealed the truth only in a 
private conversation with the judge when pressed to reconcile. Her 
formal responses to the man’s allegations had been that they did not have 
much to talk about and rarely stayed together. She had been unwilling to 
refute the man because “[i]n front of so many people, I cannot speak this 
out.” 
Equally reticent was the plaintiff in the Shanghai Migrant Worker’s 
Case, in which the young wife, already leaving home for work in 
Shanghai and separated from her husband for over two years, had filed a 
divorce petition. The filing statement only mentioned that she had been 
beaten by her mother-in-law. Throughout the pre-trial mediation 
sessions, she had been reluctant to reveal the truth, even after being 
grilled by the judge over why she wanted to divorce the man whose 
family was in economic distress. Her responses were, “But we still 
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quarrel every day, every night.” “Every night” was emphasized. She 
continued, “I left for Shanghai as a migrant worker since I could not 
stand it anymore.” Her sobbing continued. She also denied that she had 
been having an affair. Puzzled and impatient, the judge amplified her 
voice, urging her to withdraw the petition. 
At this moment, her lawyer approached the judge, pulling at her 
sleeve, hinting for a private talk. After they walked to the staircase in the 
corner, the lawyer whispered:  
The boy has that kind of disease, thus cannot have a normal sex life. As 
a young man, the way he released his desires was to scratch girls’ 
genitals. She could not sleep the whole night. Her genitals had been 
injured to the extent that she could not even get out of bed, let alone 
walk. It was so serious that the girl returned to her natal home and was 
afraid to go back. After the man stalked her in her natal home, she went 
to Shanghai. This is the main point for the divorce petition, but the girl 
is unable to speak up herself.  
Then, the judge wondered why the couple had a child. The lawyer 
responded: 
The boy is four-year-old now. The man got the disease, perhaps, two 
years ago. It was unclear why a young man got such a disease. He had 
been unwilling to see a doctor. At this young age, he was eager to do it, 
but he couldn’t. So he did not allow the lady to sleep. She was so 
tortured and her whole body was trembling when she mentioned this.  
The judge was not convinced, that is, until the woman agreed to 
withdraw the petition, under her lawyer’s persuasion that a divorce 
would be impossible this time. Happy to learn of the withdrawal, the man 
pleaded with the woman to go home with him—a patrilocal practice: 
since the divorce is not granted, the wife is to return home with the man, 
in spite of the fact she has already filed a divorce petition. The girl grew 
agitated, “We fought every night. Do you believe we can live together? I 
feel scared when I see you now!” Upon hearing this, the man’s face 
froze. He stood still, embarrassed.  
In the presence of the husband, the judge, and her lawyer, the woman 
did not mention her husband’s sexual problem. She only said, “We 
fought every day and every night.” She tried to use the nightly fighting as 
cover for the embarrassing topic of male impotency. When the judge 
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pressed on whether she had another man, she did not reveal the secret. 
She would have rather taken the moral blame that she was divorcing him 
for economic reasons. Her response was to sob.  
Even after she had withdrawn the case, she avoided mentioning her 
husband’s impotency. What she had said about her husband was, “We 
fought every night. Do you believe we can live together? I feel scared 
when I see you now!” When the man’s family tried to take her home 
upon knowing that she had withdrawn the case, she sprang from her 
chair and cried, “I will not live with you! I will never go to your home! I 
will file another petition in six months!” Without knowing the real 
reason behind the fighting, these statements are hard to comprehend. The 
woman was still trying to use the fighting and other vague language to 
cover for her husband’s impotency. The man, knowing what was implied 
by her words, turned pale in embarrassment. 
Despite living in Shanghai for two years, she was silent on the 
impotency issue, both orally and written. She used all kinds of words to 
cover it up, even when pressed by the judge. She only shared this with 
her lawyer, perhaps because she had learned that her original reason—
being beaten by her mother-in-law, who had psychiatric problems—was 
not enough to grant a divorce, or because she realized that the financial 
distress of the family would make her divorce petition more elusive. One 
thing was clear: the cultural bias against open discussion of male 
impotency is widespread: Even the lawyer had only “whispered” to the 
judge in the staircase in the corner and used “that kind of disease” to 
refer to the problem; he did not break the stalemate until the judges urged 
his client to drop the divorce petition.  
Similarly, the young woman in the Attempted Rape Case had been 
initially inhibited by this cultural bias. She had met her husband while 
working in the city as a migrant worker. Her husband, a lorry driver, 
claimed that for over a year she had never been home, abandoning their 
son and refusing to do any domestic work. Both parties agreed to divorce 
but fought over custody and property. The girl insisted on the 80,000 
yuan land requisition compensation, which would have been her share. 
The husband’s family, however, only agreed to compensate 10,000 yuan, 
and insisted on child custody with child support. 
A private caucus was conducted between the judge and the husband, 
with his legal representative, but the husband appeared not to have the 
final say. He consulted his father on every issue. When the judge said 
20,000 yuan was too low, given that the land compensation of her share 
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had already reached 80,000 yuan, the husband’s legal representative 
stepped out of the judge’s office, once again, to call the husband’s father. 
At this moment, the woman went into the office, alone. She had 
gotten into an argument with her natal family members, who had urged 
her to give up custody and lower the monetary compensation. She 
calmed herself, “I have important things to tell you, judge. During the 
first month after the boy was born82, his father tried to rape me. . . . He 
opened my door, rushed to my bed, embraced me forcefully, kissed me, 
and wildly fondled my breasts. I resisted frantically, screaming.” She 
later explained that no family members had been around: her mother-in-
law was shopping in town; her husband was on his way, driving the 
lorry. She continued: 
This happened three times in total. I took preparatory measures the 
second time. He held me from behind, and took off my pants. I resisted 
vehemently, kneeing down to hold his legs and threw him off. I sprang 
up faster than he did, running out of the home. The third time he almost 
got me. Unexpectedly, my mother-in-law came home. He had to set me 
free. 
Asked by the judge if she had told anyone about it, she responded: 
My mother-in-law did not say a word. She was not in a position to 
confront my father-in-law, who is the king at home. He beats her all the 
time. My husband did not trust my words. He said that I had slandered 
his father, and that I had picked a fight with him. I called to tell my 
mom. She said that I should not tell anyone, to preserve my good 
reputation. She agreed to take me back to my natal home once the first 
month was over.
83
 I intended to say this to you but my parents 
prevented me from doing so. But I believed I should let you know. 
Rape, even when unsuccessful, is a serious crime. It is hard to 
pinpoint how this young woman had been hurt: fear, humiliation, panic, 
and frustration, with nobody to turn to. This was why she had left her 
conjugal home right after the child’s first month. The divorce had not 
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been because she was lazy, as the husband had claimed, nor had she been 
ambivalent towards her child: she had insisted on child custody, despite 
his illness and the stigmatization of being women with children from 
previous marriages, “Tuo Youping” (拖油瓶).84  
Even for such a crime, initially, the woman did not make the judge 
aware. As her own mother had suggested, spreading the word about the 
rape would have damaged her reputation and jeopardized her bride price 
if she were to remarry. Even her natal family tried to prevent her from 
revealing this to the judge. She made up her mind to speak out only when 
the others had left the judge’s office. Apparently, she had been waiting 
for the right moment. She had sought help from both her husband and her 
mother-in-law, but both had turned her away. These incidents underscore 
the cultural bias endemic to this issue.  
Of the three victims, this woman was the only one to have taken the 
initiative to speak out to the judge. She had also hoped to claim more 
financial compensation. The other two women, by revealing the problem, 
either directly or indirectly, had only tried to end their marriages. Neither 
realized that the damages they had suffered also warranted 
compensation. Was the woman in the Attempted Rape Case the rule, or 
the exception? In several aspects, this woman was unique. The first was 
her strong personality: energetic and upbeat, she was willing to disobey 
her natal family members, including her father and grandfather. Second, 
she was a victim of attempted rape, the damages of which were arguably 
more serious than male impotency. However, only she had been in the 
position to understand the fears, panic, and humiliation suffered in this 
process. Third, the husband’s family’s offer was laughable. When both 
parties negotiated the settlement, the position of the husband’s family 
had been firm: they only agreed to compensate the woman 10,000 yuan, 
despite the fact that her land requisition compensation had already 
reached 80,000 yuan. Even the judge suggested that this offer was too 
low. In her calculus, the compensation she demanded was not just her 
land compensation, or her contribution to the family welfare, but also the 
damages that she had suffered. When her demands were opposed—not 
even her own natal family members were on her side—she had nobody 
to turn to. Eventually, she overcame the cultural barriers—she had the 
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vague intuition that revealing the truth to the judge would better position 
her for negotiation. 
These four victims each spoke out in the context of mediation. This 
pattern exists for three reasons. First, mediation often offers a private 
caucus in which cultural bias is minimized. Even in the Shanghai 
Migrant Worker’s Case, the lawyer took the judge outside of the 
conference room and told her the genuine reason for the divorce. Second, 
in mediation, judges always mount pressure. To resist them, the victims 
have to speak out. Finally, the judge is a woman too, and women appear 
more comfortable to discuss such embarrassing topics. Indeed, the author 
never directly heard similar stories from a male judge. 
IV. JUDGES’ INACTION 
When they overcame the cultural bias and revealed the truth, how did 
the judge respond? To what extent are these stories factored into their 
final judgments? How have social norms affected the courts’ decisions, 
and how do law, gender, and sex interact?  
In all four cases, upon hearing the stories, the judges were surprised or 
shocked.85 In some circumstances, they were half-convinced. A clear 
pattern, however, was that no further actions were taken—no 
verifications, no further investigations, and sometimes not even any 
further inquiry. 
In the Shandong Waitress’s Case, the female judge, in her late forties, 
was herself embarrassed by the topic. She had been trying to talk the 
plaintiff into withdrawing the case. Upon learning the truth, the judge 
realized that her proposed solution—a child—would not work. After 
that, she no longer attempted to persuade the plaintiff to maintain the 
marriage. The conversation came to a halt, and the plaintiff did not raise 
it in trial—nor did the judge. As is documented in the literature, in 
divorce cases, the courts forgo the former practice of investigating the 
cause for divorce. This had been the convention during the Mao era and 
the early period of reform.86 In most cases, the judges had only focused 
on the issues claimed, and more importantly, only on those integral to 
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their final decisions.87 In this case, the woman never claimed that the 
man’s sexual impotency had been the reason for divorce. Even though 
the plaintiff had confided this to the judge in private, her goal was to 
resist reconciliation pressure from the judges. That goal had already been 
achieved: the judge stopped pushing. Moreover, the man agreed to a 
divorce. The issue of whether to divorce had already been settled. Why 
should the judgment hinge on an embarrassing issue unrelated to the 
final resolution of the case? Why bother to verify or conduct a further 
investigation?  
This inaction persisted into post-trial mediation. Even though the two 
parties had difficulty reconciling property division, the judge never even 
hinted to the man that it had been his erectile dysfunction that had 
overshadowed, if not caused, the divorce. Had she invoked this issue she 
could have expected the man’s denial. To defend his dignity, he would 
have fought the allegations. Then to resolve the issue, the court would 
have had to conduct further investigations. Again, why bother?  
The pattern of inaction was also revealed in the Shanghai Migrant 
Worker’s Case, as the judge skirted this issue. It was in the pre-trial 
mediation session that the problem was revealed, in private, through the 
lawyer. Nothing had been raised in the formal filing statement. For the 
same reason, why should the judge bother to look into it? The judge had 
been convinced only by the conversations and body language between 
the couple, and the man’s embarrassing facial expression. While the 
revealed reason might help her understand whether or not the marriage 
could be preserved, any further inquiry seemed redundant, as far as the 
final decision was concerned. She continued her mediation efforts by 
informing her lawyer that a divorce outcome for such a first-time petition 
would be impossible. Thus, she coerced the plaintiff to drop the petition. 
Similar in the Bride-Price Case, the judge, upon learning the real reason 
for divorce, stopped pressing the woman, and instead pursued mediation 
on the bride-price.  
The Attempted Rape Case had been different, but not by much. Upon 
learning of the rape, the judge did nothing to verify the claims. Nor did 
she report the case to the police, even though she herself, based on the 
reaction of the husband’s legal representative, had believed the woman’s 
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account. Instead, she used it as a bargaining chip to press the husband’s 
side. She did not encourage the woman to report it to the police or file a 
criminal case, because that would not have been necessary for her to 
dispose of the case. To convict the father-in-law, the evidence would 
have to come not just from the victim, but also from other sources. The 
woman, when attacked, had been with her less-than-one-month-old baby. 
In panic and fear, how could she have preserved evidence? As long as 
the father-in-law denied all the accusations, which was likely, the case 
would likely not be substantiated. The father-in-law could argue that the 
woman had framed him. Had that happened, the woman would have lost 
both face and her reputation, embarrassing both herself and her natal 
family members even more. Indeed, an attempted but unsuccessful rape 
often leaves little trace. Encouraging the woman to file a criminal lawsuit 
might have backfired. 
Moreover, the strong-willed father-in-law seemed to enjoy absolute 
authority within the family. He often beat his wife, and his son was so 
obedient to him that he sought his bit-by-bit instructions in negotiation. 
He exemplified the patriarch in China’s tradition. He attempted to rape 
the daughter-in-law three times. At the very least, he knew that she 
would be unlikely to disclose this. He must have been surprised when 
she did report it to the judge, a symbol of judicial power and public 
force. He might not have had a clear idea of whether the judge would 
take further actions. For him, the best strategy was to compromise and 
terminate the marriage as soon as possible. This aligned with the judge’s 
goal. Using the incident to force the father-in-law into a financial 
compromise, in a way, the judge had supported the lady. After all, that 
was all she had asked for.  
This was why the judge had utilized this revelation as a bargaining 
chip. No matter how much she hated the father-in-law, or how 
sympathetic she was to the lady, her goal was to close the case. She was 
unconcerned with whether she could also help the lady. Even if the judge 
and the victim had managed to locate evidence, the ultimate goal would 
still have been to end the case. As long as this objective was achieved, 
any evidence uncovered would have been buried. Obtaining this 
evidence would have been helpful, but not crucial, to achieving the 
judge’s ultimate goal.  
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V. GENDERED OUTCOMES 
Judges’ inaction is understandable because either encouraging victims 
to speak out, or taking an assertive role, would upend the balance 
between the litigation parties. Then, the judges might not be able to 
achieve the mediated outcomes that fit their interests. This approach 
takes a toll on women’s interests. 
In the Shandong Waitress’s Case, upon learning the real cause of her 
divorce, the judge did not tell the waitress that this might provide her 
with a favorable litigation strategy.88 Had the woman explicitly stated 
that sexual impotency had been the real reason for divorce, the dynamics 
of the trial would have been different. Without clarifying this, the 
woman, as the plaintiff in a divorce, could only focus on trivial issues, 
such as the man’s gambling and his reluctance to support the family, to 
prove the breakdown of mutual affection. As a result, the position of the 
husband’s side was arrogant. Throughout the trial and the mediation, 
they never mentioned impotency. While they agreed to divorce, they 
staged a show of property encroachment between a poor, greedy rural 
family and an honest, affluent urban household. They summoned three 
witnesses, each well-respected in the region, to prove that the man’s 
family was the owner of the apartment. The man’s father, a mid-level 
manager of an SOE, requested a meeting with the judge to detail the 
purchase process in which he, in order to buy the apartment, had 
borrowed money from friends and relatives. A divorce rooted in male 
impotency had thus been transformed into a righteous defense against a 
greedy encroacher, locating the husband’s family on the moral and legal 
high ground. Had male impotency been disclosed in the trial, the over-
confident position of the man’s family would have been upended. Of 
course, it was expected that the man would have fought such allegations, 
but the law and the evidence would have been on the woman’s side. 
If this had been disclosed, the adjudicated outcome would have been 
better for the woman. It seemed that the man, cognizant of his 
impotency, had still decided to marry the woman, and the marriage had 
continued for three years while the condition remained uncured. This 
may have constituted deceit and damages to the woman. According to 
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Article 10 of Marriage Law,89 a marriage is void when there is an 
existing medically confirmed disease inappropriate for marriage that is 
not cured after the marriage.90 While impotence is not explicitly listed as 
a disease inappropriate for marriage, infertility is a serious concern for 
most families. In judicial practices, this Article usually forms the basis to 
void marriages. This is also widely understood and accepted among the 
general public. Furthermore, based on Article 39, the court will then 
partition the conjugal property in the woman’s favor, because the man 
had concealed his condition before the marriage.91  
With impotency disclosed, the man’s position in the post-trial 
mediation would have been compromised. With an unfavorable 
adjudicated decision pending, he might have been willing to make 
significant concessions. Without the open disclosure, however, the 
woman’s private conversation with the judge served only to resist the 
judge’s pressure toward mediated reconciliation. Since the man was not 
opposing the divorce, the disclosure accomplished little.  
The Shandong waitress did not get what she deserved, and the woman 
in the Bride-Price Case suffered a significant financial loss. When the 
judge ran out of ideas to reconcile the two sides, the lay assessor, a 
retired village official in his early seventies, stepped in to talk to the 
woman, her parents, and her legal representative, stated: 
Look! The other side offering such a big bride-price, the only purpose 
was to get a daughter-in-law. Your girl kicked the groom out the third 
day after being wed, and rented a room herself—still refusing to live 
with him. How would you feel if you were in their shoes? Staying in 
the man’s family for less than 15 days, this might have constituted 
marital fraud. It would be a criminal case instead of a civil one. Then, 
the situation would be far more complicated than returning the bride-
price: the whole family might be incriminated. 
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Fraudulent sales of women as “brides” are common in China.92 After 
making handsome payments, those men soon found their “brides” 
evaporated, along with the bride token.93 Of China’s population of 1.4 
billion, males are approximately thirty-four million more than females, a 
demographic nightmare stemmed from the long-time one-child policy 
and ingrained cultural preference for sons over daughters.94
 
The shortage 
of brides is further exacerbated by village women’s migration to cities in 
the reform period.95 Some families have to pay off human traffickers to 
locate daughters-in-law for their unmarried sons. According to Li:  
[E]stranged husbands who are caught up in divorce suits often turn into 
outraged defendants, taking out their marital frustrations on judges in 
charge of their cases. Adjudicating divorce thus comes with a set of 
occupational hazards, harassment, verbal abuse, threats of violence, 
threats of suicide, revenge aimed at one’s family members . . . The list 
can go on in terms of the pains angry men can inflict on their judges.
96
 
Upon hearing this, the woman’s side was rattled. They immediately 
accepted a deal to return the full 130,000 yuan bride-price, even though 
initially the man had only asked for 110,000 yuan. The law states there is 
no need to return the bride-price under these circumstances because she 
had indeed lived with the man.97 The situation would have been more 
ambiguous had the judge told the woman to raise the man’s erectile 
dysfunction in the litigation process. Once again, she had been 
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preoccupied with getting a mediated result. The lay assessor, aware of 
what the judge wanted, had volunteered to threaten the woman’s family 
with a criminal charge, coercing her side to compromise.98 Since this was 
consistent with the judge’s interests, she had turned a blind eye to the 
unfair settled outcome.  
As for the Shanghai Migrant Worker, the judge had been skeptical of 
the lawyer’s story, but convinced by the man’s facial expression and the 
couple’s interactions. The judge had only told the woman’s lawyer that a 
divorce was impossible, and that the family needed time to accept the 
woman’s departure. When the lawyer resisted by saying that she had 
been away from home for two years and the family should have already 
been prepared, the judge continued:  
That was before the formal divorce petition, which was not understood 
by the court. This is the first time she has formally filed the divorce 
petition. This is also the first time for the man’s family to understand 
that she truly wants to leave them. This is different. You have 
represented numerous divorce cases. Think about it: under such a 
family background, how much pressure can the little young man take? 
He said to us that he would rather die than be divorced. Such a threat is 
realistic, should a divorce be granted now. So, this time, even if we 
have a formal trial on the case, the outcome would also be rejecting the 
woman’s divorce petition. That is why I hope you can cooperate with 
us and help persuade the woman to withdraw the petition. She could, of 
course, file another petition in six months, if she still wants to divorce 
him then. This divorce petition would be considered when the next 
petition is adjudicated. 
Given the shortage of brides, anxieties over finding a second one after 
a divorce are palpable, especially for an impoverished family like this. 
The judge was sensible to find a solution: the case result was a 
“voluntary withdrawal.” The woman gained nothing by revealing the 
damages she had suffered through her lawyer’s private conversation with 
the judge. A divorce denial was more to address the judge’s stability 
concerns and to allow the man’s family more time to prepare for her 
departure. The judge, realizing the inevitable collapse of the marriage, 
resorted to the safest strategy: no divorce for the first-time divorce 
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petition, whether it was withdrawn or adjudicated. She used the excuse 
that for the first time; both the court and the man’s family knew there 
would be a divorce.  
Such an outcome was not inevitable. Had the judge told the woman 
and her lawyer to add this reason for divorce to the formal filing 
statement, she could have cited domestic violence—she had been injured 
to the extent that she could not walk—and rendered a divorce with 
financial compensation. Since the issue of the case had been divorce 
only—not property division—the woman had not suffered financially. 
However, she had wasted at least six months in the meaningless 
marriage.  
In the Attempted Rape Case, the outcomes were indeed changed by 
the judge’s behavior. In their post-trial mediation, the husband and his 
legal representative, after consulting the husband’s father several times, 
decided to increase the compensation from the initial offer of 10,000 to 
25,000 yuan. This was still well below the woman’s demand of 80,000 
yuan. The judge asked the man to leave the office and then spoke to his 
legal representative in private:  
50,000 yuan, and no child support. The father-in-law attempted to rape 
this woman three times. As you see, she just asked me to deal with this 
matter. I was pondering whether to report this to the police. Why 
shouldn’t I? Now you call your friend, the father-in-law, and see if the 
woman’s requests can be met.  
Ten minutes later, the legal representative returned from the call 
without uttering a word. His facial expression, however, confirmed the 
accusations. A settlement was struck: the husband’s family agreed to pay 
40,000 yuan, in response to the judge’s 50,000 yuan suggestion, and the 
woman gave up custody of their child.  
This appeared to be a triumph for the woman. The negotiation process 
had been painful. The father-in-law, who had the final say for his son’s 
issues, was resolute. After several rounds of back and forth, he was only 
willing to increase the compensation from 10,000 to 25,000, and on the 
condition that the woman paid 500 yuan per month in child support. 
Nothing suggested that he would cave in. The patrilineal and patrilocal 
biases against women also placed him in an advantageous negotiating 
position. That is also why the initial mediation had been a stalemate.  
The father-in-law might never have expected the woman to disclose 
the rape. This was why he had attempted to rape her repeatedly and held 
468 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.28.3  
such a firm position in the negotiations. He believed that she had to 
swallow this, in order to protect her reputation. Despite his expectations, 
the woman did disclose this to the judge. While the judge may not have 
been in the position to criminally prosecute him, she represented the 
public power. Indeed, it was never clear whether the father-in-law, a 
peasant, could tell the difference between the court and the police. For 
such a man, there is likely information asymmetry between what he 
thought a judge could do and what the law authorizes a judge to do. In 
his mind, a formal investigation of the judge might have put him in jail. 
Thus, such disclosure to the judge was intimidating enough. Under these 
circumstances, his best strategy was to settle as soon as possible.  
Nevertheless, such a triumph was limited, due to the judge’s 
indifference. Its net value was 15,000 yuan, and the woman had to give 
up custody. The woman could have gained more, had the judge been 
more assertive, instead of relishing on an easy solution. She did not need 
a police report, as analyzed before; she could have just pushed a little 
harder. However, she did not even fight for the original suggestion of 
50,000 yuan. As mentioned, the land compensation for the woman’s 
share had already reached 80,000 yuan, not to mention her trauma from 
the attempted rape and her other contributions to the family. Moreover, 
the man’s side had the money to pay: from land compensation and the 
man’s regular job as a lorry driver. Indeed, threatening a party with jail 
time is an effective tactic for a judge to strike a deal. Professor Li Su has 
documented a physically intimidating man who confronted his neighbor 
after seducing his wife.99 Upon hearing a criminal threat from the court, 
he had been willing to increase the compensation and serve legally 
baseless jail time.100 In practices of criminal reconciliation, similar 
compromises abound.101  
In sum, even in those rare cases in which the victims have overcome 
the cultural barriers to speak out, the final outcomes are gendered due to 
the judges’ inaction or indifference. Coming clean to the judge is not 
useless, but the impact is limited. The outcomes are only slightly tilted in 
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their favor. Had the judges been more assertive, the women would have 
been treated more fairly. The judges’ modus operandi thus reinforces the 
gendered outcomes.  
VI. FEMALE INFERTILITY 
If judges are indifferent to male impotency, how do they react to 
female infertility? The contrast will help illustrate the gendered 
outcomes. Generally, judges find this issue understandable: in most 
situations, the man gets what he wants. Often, men have little inhibition 
to make a claim and file to divorce infertile women. The judges simply 
endorse their rights etched into China’s cultural constellation. After all, a 
moral, responsible Chinese woman produces a “quality” child at the right 
time—soon after marriage.102 As Professor Lisa Handwerker notes, it is 
women who are invariably blamed for infertility.103 Both the state’s 
population policy and Confucian gender ideals assume that the normative 
female body, not the male body, is and should be fertile.104 
In this case, a thirty-five-year-old man, a family’s only son, sued to 
divorce his wife, who had recently become seriously ill.105 With anasarca 
spread to her face, she had been too weak to finish the pre-trial 
conversations with the judge. Two years older than the man, she looked 
like his mother. After six years of marriage, they still had no children. 
The formal filing for divorce stated that the foundation of the affection 
was shaky and that there was personality incompatibility. However, the 
genuine reason for the divorce, as the man’s legal representative stated in 
trial, was the woman’s infertility. They had tried to treat her condition 
but to no avail. The man’s father, on his deathbed, had nagged him to 
find another woman who could bear him a child. For the father, this 
seemed the only way to extend the lineage. The judge’s brief 
investigation found that all of the man’s family members, including his 
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parents, had been fond of her. After he had been laid off from a local 
SOE, she had supported his education in Shanghai for three years. This 
had qualified him to become an anesthesiologist (The Anesthesiologist’ 
Case). She had also tended to her father-in-law for nine months in the 
hospital before he died. After the man had found a new job, and with his 
parents gone, he had initiated the divorce petition.  
Helpless, the woman said to the judge, “No matter how much I did, I 
did not deliver an heir for their family. That is my fault. Being so ill, 
there is no chance for me to be pregnant. I am a burden for the family.” 
A divorce outcome seemed both inevitable and understandable for this ill 
woman: “[f]or all the housework I did for the family for so many years, I 
only requested a place to stay after the divorce—that is, the 40 square 
meter apartment subsidized by his original work unit.” Since the man had 
inherited a large apartment from his father, the case was settled soon 
after the man agreed to the woman’s request.  
As shown, to get a divorce, men usually include additional reasons for 
divorce, such as the incompatibility of personality, family discord, or a 
lack of mutual understanding before marriage. However, once the issue 
of infertility is brought up, both litigation parties, and other litigation 
participants, including the judge, all know the genuine reason for 
divorce. Unlike male impotency or other sex-related male conditions, 
which are often buried without a trace, female infertility, regarded as a 
physiological and more importantly, a cultural defect, is openly 
discussed in trial and recorded in the adjudication documents. There is no 
privacy. By taking this position, the judge and the court endorse the 
male-dominant culture. 
In the above case, even though it was a first-time petition, there was 
no resistance for a divorce outcome. The man was not blamed for his 
heartless action: filing to divorce the woman when she was gravely ill, 
and right after he had landed a job, which, without the long-term support 
of the woman, would have been impossible to get. The man also made no 
compromises on property division. He got the large apartment, and the 
woman got the small one. Both apartments had been matrimonial 
property and should have been equally divided. The judge never raised 
this point in the mediation, even though the law stipulates that women 
2020] When The Cultural Explanation Is Inadequate 471 
and children’s property rights should be favored.106 The woman was 
willing to accept the small one because she felt guilty for not delivering a 
child for the family; therefore, why bother? The woman blamed herself 
for not fulfilling the responsibility of continuing the lineage, and thus for 
the “breakdown of mutual affection.” She said to the judge, “This is my 
fault. . . . I am a burden for the family.” Internalized by this cultural bias, 
she had thus forgone any leverage on the issue of property division. This 
was why she only asked for the minimum living conditions: basic shelter.  
As far as the judge was concerned, she was glad to facilitate such a 
settlement. Female infertility is regarded as a strong basis for the 
breakdown of mutual affection, thus meeting the standardized legal 
criteria for divorce. A divorce, even with property division favoring the 
man, had been a natural outcome.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Cultural biases, as reflected in their discourses, are an obstacle toward 
gender equality in court. Similarly, traditional biases against women 
exist in China.107 As illustrated, the biases make women inhibited to 
speak out their sufferings. Moreover, the judges, even when women do 
speak out, turn a blind eye to these sufferings.  
Under such a modus operandi, the cultural biases against women in 
Chinese society, especially in the rural areas,108 find their ways into the 
judicial decision-making process and further disadvantage women’s 
property rights in divorce litigation. These biases include, but are not 
limited to, patrilineal ideologies, patrilocal practices, and women’s roles 
in issues related to sex. Ingrained in Chinese society, these biases 
marginalize women and are converted into diminished property rights. 
Consistent with the cultural biases, the judges rarely broach the issue of 
sex during divorce litigation. In the few exceptions in which the incidents 
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are revealed to the court, the judges brush them off. Suffering from this 
sexual bias in court, women fail to make their claims, and thus receive 
less property or compensation than they deserve. Another layer of 
gendered outcomes is perpetuated.  
Judges’ inaction and indifference toward issues related to sexual 
problems are consistent with their behavior patterns towards domestic 
violence.109 After all, male impotency and rape are also damages. The 
difference is that the laws do not explicitly provide protection against 
male impotency.110 Due to the incentive constraints, the judges are even 
more reluctant to take action for male impotency than for domestic 
violence.111 This is why we have witnessed the penetration of cultural 
biases. 
Their indifference and inaction also perpetuate the gendered 
outcomes, since these revelations do not make a difference in the 
litigation process: the victims are more reticent, unwilling to share their 
suffering with the judges. Furthermore, turning a blind eye to these 
inflictions has ripple effects outside the courts. When rural women go to 
great lengths to seek legal assistance for marital rape, Li found that legal 
workers only state “what he did was lawful.”112 Li argues that the legal 
workers could help the victim make a claim based on personal injury, 
even if marital rape is exempted under Chinese law.113 However, even if 
the claims had been presented to the court, the judge would have asked: 
what is the evidence? The inflictor would be even more confident 
because the issue is usually difficult to prove. Ultimately, it is the judge’s 
behavior that shapes legal workers’ approaches. If the judges had been 
proactive in protecting women’s interests, the lawyers may also have 
changed their behavior accordingly.  
As Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues, only when the judges act 
can equality promises be invoked.114 To reduce gendered outcomes, an 
important step would be to reveal the imbalance and unfairness resulting 
from judicial implementation of the gender-neutral principles and 
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rules.115 Focusing on the courts’ institutional constraints, this Article 
offers an alternative reform agenda. An immediate remedy to reduce 
gendered outcomes in the litigation process would be to adjust how the 
judges are assessed. A fundamental approach is to alienate the 
bureaucratic and political concerns from the legal goals embedded in the 
judicial process.  
First, the use of mediation should be more cautious. As demonstrated, 
the pursuit of a high mediation rate has been the major source of 
gendered outcomes.116 Despite its positive functions, mediation 
trivializes domestic violence, sacrifices women’s rights to child custody, 
and ignores cultural and economic biases against women. Mediation also 
allows, and even encourages, the trade-off between divorce and child 
custody and property; it is the platform and the conduit to perpetuating 
gender inequality. In common law jurisdiction, mediation is used to settle 
family disputes, but its role is limited.117 In light of China’s practices, 
there is a reason for this limited role.118 
Eliminating all mediation from divorce cases may be unrealistic. Due 
to the intimate relationship between litigants in family cases, in 2015 a 
nationwide “family cases trial reform”119 sought to preserve and 
reconcile marriages through intensive mediation. The courts in Gansu 
Province, for example, “push for reconciliation and not divorce.”120 
Guangdong High Court stresses the priority of mediation and the set-up 
of mediation before the hearing in family cases.121 In reality, however, 
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some courts in the more developed areas have deepened the division of 
labor in the courts due to caseload pressure: the judges adjudicate while 
non-adjudicating personnel mediate. Some interviewed judges suggested 
that the role of mediation had declined in their courts. Different 
trajectories notwithstanding, mediation will likely persist in China’s 
family law practices. 
As long as mediation is still allowed in divorce proceedings, judges 
should inform litigants of its gendered implications before they accept a 
settlement. Judges should also inform the victims that domestic violence 
will not be factored in mediation. A fundamental step would be to once 
and for all bar mediation for cases involving established domestic 
violence. Judges should warn the litigants that in mediation, their rights 
may be traded for consent to divorce. The judges should also determine 
child custody independent of other concerns, rather than use it as a 
bargaining chip. For sex-related issues, the judges should inform the 
litigants of the pros and cons of disclosing them in the hearing, as 
opposed to in mediation.  
Second, the courts should be more cautious when pursuing efficiency. 
Given the explosion of caseloads in many courts, there is a pressing need 
to process cases efficiently. Such a pursuit, however, is often realized at 
the expense of women. Bidding for the conjugal apartment is one 
example. The divorcing parties need to be informed of the pitfalls when 
choosing bidding as a way to divide their apartment. When one party is 
short on cash, bidding may not be in their best interests, even if a market 
appraisal costs.  
Third, judges’ gender consciousness, despite its improvement, still 
needs enlightenment. While the SPC Guidelines already required judges 
specialized in divorce cases to receive at least twelve hours for gender 
education and eighteen hours for domestic violence, 122 it is unclear 
whether the requirements have been implemented. Many judges do not 
even realize that their approaches are gendered. Furthermore, when they 
are inundated in the institutional concerns, they may lose sight of the 
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cultural and economic biases against women, as shown in the cases 
related to patrilocal, patrilineal, bride-price, and sexual issues. More 
gender consciousness training is needed, in addition to replacing the 
current institutional concerns with concerns that prevent gender biases.  
 
